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Wheeler: Refining "Sale or Exchange" in Light of Crane

REDEFINING "SALE OR EXCHANGE"
IN LIGHT OF Crane
INTRODUCrION

Until recently, taxpayers facing financial loss upon foreclosure of nonrecourse mortgages could derive a significant income tax advantage by
abandoning their encumbered interests or by disposing of them through
deeds in lieu of foreclosure.' Because section 1222 of the Internal Revenue
Code 2 restricts capital characterization to losses realized upon the "sale or exchange" of capital assets,3 dispositions failing to qualify as "sales or exchanges" give rise to ordinary losses and concomitantly larger potential deductions. 4 While forced sales accompanying judicial foreclosure of nonrecourse
mortgages have long been recognized as "sales or exchanges" for purposes of
section 1222, 5 abandonments and voluntary reconveyances by nonrecourse
mortgagors traditionally have escaped "sale or exchange" classification.0
Historically, courts have reasoned that in the absence of additional compensation inuring to the nonrecourse obligor, abandonments and voluntary
reconveyances fail to produce consideration for the transfer and, therefore,
are fatally deficient as "sales or exchanges." 7
In a. series of recent decisions, the Tax Court rejected the ordinary loss
characterization traditionally accorded to abandonment and reconveyance
losses." Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Crane v. Commissioner,9 the
1. Handler, Tax Consequences of Mortgage Foreclosures and Transfers of Real Property
to the Mortgagee, 31 TAx L. REV. 191,239, 244 (1976). See also Cleveland, Foreclosure,Abandonment, and Settlement: The Tax Effects on Mortgagors, 9 TAX Anvismaa 68 (1978); Ginsberg,
The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAXES 719 (1975).

2. I.R.C. § 1222 (1976).
3. Id. provides capital characterization for gains or losses realized upon: (1) the "sale or
exchange" of (2) a capital asset (3) which has been held for a designated holding period. While
all three statutory requirements are essential to achieving capital characterization, this paper
will examine only the "sale or exchange" element of capital treatment. Unless expressly noted
to the contrary, it will be assumed that the remaining two statutory requirements have been
satisfied in the transactions discussed.
4. Taxpayers frequently want to avoid capital gains treatment because § 1211(b) limits
the deductibility of losses arising upon the "sale or exchange" of capital assets to the extent of
gains from such sales or exchanges, plus the smallest of: (1) the year's taxable income reduced
by the zero bracket amount, (2) $3,000 ($1,500 for husbands and wives filing separately), or (3)
the sum of (i) the excess of the net short-term capital loss over the net short-term capital
gain, and (ii) one-half of the excess of the net long-term capital loss over the net short-term
capital gain. Id. § 1211(b).
5. See, e.g., Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 312 US. 666 (1941),
rev'g per curiam 115 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1940).
6. See supra note 1.

7. See, e.g., Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941).
8. Afiddleton v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 310, 319-20 (1981); O'Brien v. Commissioner, 77
T.C. 113, 119 (1981); Guest v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 9, 21-24 (1981); Arkin v. Commissioner,
76 T.C. 1048, 1055-56 (1981); Amon v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 1167, 1169 (1981); Abrams
v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 355, 358 (1981); Hope v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. 224, 225 (1981);
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Tax Court found that "relief from indebtedness, even though there is no
personal liability, is sufficient to support a sale or exchange."' 10
Defining a nonrecourse obligor's uncompensated disposition of encumbered
property as a "sale or exchange" represents a radical departure from established case law. Reaching this result on authority of Crane reflects a perhaps
unwarranted extension of the Crane doctrine from the area of income realization into that of gain and loss characterization. This article will examine the
propriety and significance of the Tax Court's expanded definition of "sale
or exchange."
THE STATUTORY DISTINCTION BETWEEN A "SALE OR
EXCHANGE" AND A "SALE OR OTHER DISPOSITION"

The distinction drawn by the Internal Revenue Code between a "sale
or exchange"'" and a "sale or other disposition"'12 creates some uncertainty
as to the correct application of the Code's income realization, recognition, and
characterization provisions. While sections 1001(a) and (b) provide broadly that
13
gain or loss is realized upon the "sale or other disposition" of property,
section 1001(c) specifies that gain or loss is recognized upon the "sale or exchange" of property. 14 Section 1222 similarly limits capital characterization to
gains or losses realized upon the "sale or exchange" of capital assets. 15
The significance of this differing terminology remains open to debate.
Several authorities suggest that the realization-recognition distinction in
section 1001 may be disregarded without violating the section's statutory
intent. One commentator submits that the difference in terminology is
accidental and without purposeful distinction.' The Second Circuit has
theorized that section 1001(c) may confer nonrecognition upon certain exchanges rather than delineate specific instances of recognition.17 Finally, the
Eighth Circuit has suggested that because inclusion in gross income of gains derived from dealings in property is mandated, realized gains must be recognized
notwithstanding subtle semantic differences appearing in section 1001.18
While no viable distinction may exist between a "sale or exchange" and
"sale or other disposition" as used within section 1001, the phrases cannot be
deemed coterminous for purposes of applying the Code's characterization
Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980); Brountas v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1062, 1072
(1980); DeGeunaro v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. 284, 285 (1980); Laport v. Commissioner, 40
T.C.M. 1134, 1186 (1980), aft'd, 671 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1982).
9. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
10. Middleton v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 310, 324 (1981) (emphasis in original); Freeland
v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970, 981 (1980).
11. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (1976).
12. Id. §§ 1001(a) & (b); 1222.
13. Id. § 1001(a) & (b).
14. Id. § 1001(c).
15. Id. § 1222.
16. Bittker, Capital Gains and Losses-The "Sale or Exchange" Requirement, 82
HASTINGS L.J. 743, 744 (1981).
17. Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980).
18. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol34/iss5/7

2

Wheeler: Refining "Sale or Exchange" in Light of Crane
REDEFINING "SALE OR EXCHANGE"

1982]

provisions without violating established principles of statutory construction
and long-standing case law.-o Imposing a synonymous definition upon the
terms contravenes the principle that a rational Congress is conclusively presumed to have intended substantive differences by using different language
in given provisions.2 0 Congress frequently has converted ordinary gains or
losses into capital items by according "sale or exchange" treatment to otherwise nonqualifying dispositions which further suggests that Congress appreciates the significance of "sale or exchange" status and deliberately uses the
term to effectuate its will.21
Case law expressly recognizes that a section 1001(a) "sale or other disposition" cannot be equated automatically with a section 1222 "sale or exchange." In 1941, the Supreme Court in Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak
Leather Co.22 refused to acknowledge a taxpayer's casualty loss and subsequent insurance reimbursement as a "sale or exchange," even though the
' 23
transaction dearly constituted a section 1001(a) "sale or other disposition.
The taxpayer in Flaccus claimed insurance reimbursements from casualty
losses as a "sale or exchange." 24 After noting that the language in the Revenue
Act, as in any statute, must be given its ordinary meaning, the Court concluded that neither "sale" nor "exchange" accurately described the taxpayer's
casualty loss and subsequent reimbursement.25 Flaccus created a continuing
rift between the terms "disposition" and "sale or exchange" which compels
2
identification of those transactions qualifying for capital treatment. 6
"SALE OR EXCHANGE" AS TRADITIONALLY DEFINmD

While neither the Code nor its regulations defines the term "sale or exchange" as used in capital gain and loss provisions, much judicial attention
has been directed toward providing a functional definition. Relying upon the
ordinary and usual meanings accorded to the words,2 7 courts traditionally have
identified a "sale" as a "transfer of property for money or a promise to pay
money," while distinguishing an "exchange" as a "reciprocal transfer of
19. But see Bittker, supra note 16, at 744, where the author states:
In the absence of a cogent reason for requiring the taxpayer's interest in capital assets
to be terminated in a special way in order to qualify for capital gain or loss treatment - and none has been suggested - it would be appropriate to interpret "sale or
exchange" as used in section 1222 as coextensive with "sale or other disposition" as
used in section 1001(a).
Id.

20. Note, Voluntary Conveyances of Property Encumbered by Nonrecourse Debt: Capital
Versus Ordinary Losses and the "Sale or Exchange" Requirement, 13 GA. L. REv. 243, 244
n.10 (1978).

21.

Id.

22. 313 US. 247 (1941).
23. Id. at 249.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Bittker, supra note 16, at 745.

27, Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 US. 247, 249 (1941).
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property." 28 Both traditional definitions expressly require that some consideration pass to the transferor.
9
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1941 decision in Helvering v. Hammel,2
some courts also limited the "sale or exchange" language in section 1222's
predecessor30 to voluntary transfers, thus exempting losses realized through
foreclosure sales from the section's application.- After analyzing the statutory
purpose, legislative history, and plain meaning of the section's language, the
Hammel Court eliminated this judicially-imposed voluntary transfer requirement from the term's definition.32 Excluding involuntary foreclosure sales
from statutory "sales or exchanges" comported neither with the plain meaning of the word "sale," nor with a perceived congressional intent to expand
transactions qualifying for capital treatment. 33
Hammel's subsequent extension and application to foreclosure sales involving nonrecourse mortgages 34 raised controversy as to whether consideration was still necessary for a "sale or exchange." The majority of courts
addressing this question found Hammel had not affected the consideration requirement.35 They concluded that because Hammel and its progeny had been
decided in the context of actual sales, where foreclosure bids clearly evidenced
consideration, the cases neither addressed nor had any bearing upon the
consideration requirement.3 6
Continued judicial emphasis upon the necessity of consideration in "sales
or exchanges" prompted informed taxpayers to structure transactions producing the most favorable tax result possible.3 7 Persons facing large gains
typically disposed of their interests only through "sales or exchanges," while

28. Commissioner v. Brown, S80 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1965). See also Middleton v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. at 326.
29. 311 U.S. 504 (1941). In Hammel, the taxpayer suffered a loss due to the disposition
of his property by a foreclosure sale. Id. at 506. He claimed this involuntary disposition
should allow full ordinary loss deduction and the court agreed. Id. at 510.
30. I.R.C. § 227(a)(2), (11) (1939) (corresponding to Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 1, § 117, 53
Stat. 1, 50-51).
81. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Hammel, 108 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1940), rev'd, 311 US.
504 (1941); Jones v. Commissioner, 89 B.T.A. 531 (1989), nonacq. 1932-2 C.B. 55; Rust v.
Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 910 (1938), nonacq. 1939-1 C.B. 62, appeal dismissed, 105 F.2d 1017
(4th Cir. 1989); Warfield v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 907 (1988), nonacq. 1939-2 C.B. 71;
Greisler v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 542 (1938), nonacq. 1989-2 C.B. 51, aff'd sub nom., Commissioner v. Freihofer, 102 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1939). Contra Commissioner v. Electro-Chemical
Engraving Co., 110 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 311 U.S. 513 (1941).
82. 311 U.S. at 510 (1941).
33. Id.
84. See Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 666 (1941), rev'g
per curiam 115 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1940); Commissioner v. Abramson, 124 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1942); Welch v. Street, 116 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1941).
85. See, e.g., Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1941); Jamison v. Commissioner,
8 T.C. 173 (1947), nonacq. 1947-1 C.B. 2; Baird v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 970 (1940),
nonacq. 1941-1 C.B. 12, acq. 1941-2 C.B. 2. Accord Lapsley v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1105
(1941), nonacq. 1941-2 C.B. 8. See also Meyers v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1044 (1944).
86. See supra note 35.
37. See supra note 1.
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those assured of realizing substantial losses attempted to surrender their
property in consideration-free dispositions.38
Purging transactions of consideration was often a formidable undertaking
because courts increasingly found "sale or exchange" status justified by a
transferor's receipt of an economic benefit.3 9 Under an economic benefit
analysis, a recourse mortgagor's gratuitous reconveyance of encumbered
property to his mortgagee yielded a "sale or exchange." The mortgagor's
relief from personal liability represented a valuable economic benefit, which
served as consideration necessary to support the sale. 40 Conversely, a nonrecourse mortgagor's voluntary reconveyance of encumbered property provided no sale-producing economic benefit to him because he suffered no
personal liability on the debt. 41 Courts further refused to recognize an
economic benefit accruing to a nonrecourse obligor upon his simultaneous
transfer of the burdens and privileges of property ownership. 42 As one court
cautioned, accepting such an argument would elevate every transfer to the
status of a sale and would impermissibly expand the statutory language to
mean "sale or any other transaction by which an owner divests himself of
property. A court is not privileged thus to rewrite legislative language, even
though it might think such substitutions better carry out the policy than the

88. See id.
39. See, e.g., Blum v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1943) (mortgagee's payment
of $250 to mortgagor's attorney as fee to obtain title constituted consideration, converting
transfer into a "sale or exchange'); Phillips v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1940)
(mortgagee's payment of mortgagor's property taxes in return for conveyance of property
constituted a "sale or exchange"); Rogers v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 580 (1989) (nonrecourse mortgagor's voluntary transfer of encumbered property to
mortgagee in return for cancellation of mortgage constitutes a sale; cancellation of personal
indebtedness equals valuable consideration).
40. See Stamler v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1944); Rogers v. Commissioner, 103
F2d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 580 (1989); Unique Art Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,
8 T.C. 1341 (1947), acq. 1947-2 C.B. 4; Peninsula Properties Co. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A.
84 (1942), acq. 1942-2 C.B. 14.
41. Commissioner v. Crane, 153 F.2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd on other grounds, 331
U.S. 1 (1947); Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941); Jamison v. Commissioner,
8 T.C. 173 (1947), nonacq. 1947-1 C.B. 2; Lapsley v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1105 (1941),
nonacq. 1941-2 C.B. 8; Baird v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 970 (1940), nonacq. 1941-1 C.B. 12,
acq., 1941-2 C.B. 2; Commonwealth, Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 B.T.A. 850 (1937), acq. 1941-2
C.B. 3.
Although a nonrecourse obligor's reconveyance alone would not produce a "sale or exchange," the transfer was still susceptible of capital characterization. Courts scrutinized such
conveyances and often found "sale or exchange" status triggered by nominal economic
benefits inuring to the transferor. The mortgagee's payment of property taxes accruing during
the nonrecourse mortgagor's ownership could transform the reconveyance into a "sale or exchange." Phillips v. Commissioner, 112 F2d 721 (8d Cir. 1940). Similarly; a mortgagee's pay.
ment of the mortgagor's $250 attorney's fee was found to qualify a transaction for capital
treatment. Blum v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1943).
42. Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F2d 35, 838 (3d Cir. 1941).
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language actually used by the lawmaking body."4 3 This reaction typifies judicial response to the "sale or exchange" question prior to Crane in 1947."
THE SERVICE'S STRUGGLE TO IMPOSE CAPITAL
CHARACTERIZATION UPON LOSSES ARISING OUT
OF ABANDONMENT AND VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS

Prior to 1947, the Internal Revenue Service appeared to be fighting a

series of losing battles in its campaign to impose capital treatment upon
losses incurred by a nonrecourse mortgagor through his disposition of encumbered property. Courts not only rejected the Service's position on consideration, but also refused to accept a substance-over-form argument advanced by the Service. 4 5 The Commissioner's substance-over-form reasoning
asserted that an abandonment or voluntary reconveyance to the mortgagee
served as the substantive equivalent of a foreclosure sale.40 Because a foreclosure sale produced a capital loss under Hammel, its substantive equivalent,
47
the transfer in lieu of foreclosure, should produce an identical tax result.
The judicial response to the foreclosure equivalent argument presented the
Commissioner with an embarassing dilemma. Courts held to the literal language of the statute and refused to impose capital treatment upon transactions
which failed to attain "sale or exchange" status. If the Commissioner could
not meet the consideration requirement for a "sale or exchange," he could
not gain access to capital characterization by portraying the nonqualifying
48
transaction as a foreclosure sale equivalent.
43.

Id. at 338. The Stokes court stated:

[I]f, as a last resort, it is urged that being rid of a piece of real estate which is a source
of burden instead of benefit is a sale, then every transfer is equally within the terms
of the statute, and "sale or exchange" must be taken to mean "sale or any other
transaction by which an owner divests himself of property." A court is not privileged
thus to rewrite legislative language, even though it might think such substitutions
better carry out the policy than the language actually used by the lawmaking body.
44. This reasoning reappeared in Fox v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 704, 715 (1974), acq.
1974-2 C.B. 2. In Fox, the taxpayer reconveyed stock purchased with both a promissory note
and embezzled funds to the holder of the note after the taxpayer's embezzlement came to the
attention of authorities. The Tax Court determined that the taxpayer was entitled to an
ordinary loss deduction under section 165(c)(2) as a result of his reconveyance. "[W]e think
petitioner should be treated no differently than a mortgagor who voluntarily conveys or
abandons the secured property to the mortgagee. Under such circumstances, no sale or
exchange ordinarily occurs." 61 T.C. at 715. In further explanation, the Fox court continued
that: "Generally, the cases hold that where the mortgagor is not personally liable, no sale or
exchange takes place when the secured property is abandoned and no consideration flows
from the mortgagee to the mortgagor." Id. at 715 n.7 (citations omitted).
The Fox court's holding, significantly, did not view pre-1947 case law as being invalidated
by the Supreme Court's Crane decision. See id. But see Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
970, 979 (1980); Lenway & Co. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 620, 628 n.9 (1978), aff'd mem., 620
F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1980).
45. See supra note 35.
46. lNote, supra note 20, at 251-56.
47. Id.
48. The Third Circuit's response in Stokes illustrates the Commissioner's dilemma. The
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Although the Commissioner's substance-over-form argument was generally
unsuccessful, in one aberrant 1943 Memorandum Opinion 9 the Tax Court
concurred with the Commissioner's position and determined that a taxpayer's
abandonment to forestall immediate foreclosure of property tax liens generated a capital loss.5 0 No reported opinion cites the case, and the Service later
described the decision in a private letter ruling as contrary to established
law prior to 1947. 51
A third argument advanced by the Commissioner asserted that specific
statutory provisions imposing "sale or exchange" treatment on designated
transactions evidenced a congressional intent to interpret the term expansively. 52 Courts rejected this argument, reasoning that statutes providing
sale or exchange treatment for specific transfers did not necessitate treating
53
every surrender of property as a "sale or exchange".
Because the Service's lack of success stemmed largely from its inability to
satisfy judicially-imposed consideration requirements, litigation was generally
fruitless from 1939 until 1947. Although each adverse holding prompted the
Commissioner's nonacquiescence,5 4 the Service otherwise appeared unable to
alter the trend of unfavorable judicial decisions. Indeed, the sparsity of case
law and revenue rulings addressing this particular issue from 1947 until 1970
suggests that the Commissioner may have abandoned the campaign until his
position on the consideration issue could be fortified. 55
In 1970 the Service turned to the United States Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Crane58 for the answer to its consideration dilemma. Crane mandated
that nonrecourse debt be included, in computing "amount realized" under
section 1001(b). 57 The first indication that the Service intended to rely on
Crane's holding in determining "sale or exchange" status appeared in a 1970
Stokes court stated:
It does not help the Commissioner to say that the taxpayers are in the same
position whether they surrender the property or whether it is taken from them by
foreclosure sale. "The answer," in the words of Mr. Justice Roberts in the McClain
case .

. .,

"is that we must apply the statute as we find it, leaving to Congress the

correction of asserted inconsistencies and inequalities in its operation."
124 F.2d at 838-39.
49. Oregon Mesabi Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 475 (1943).
50. Id. at 481. One commentator suggested that imminent certainty of threatened foreclosure distinguishes the case from the typical conveyance in lieu of foreclosure. See Note,
supra note 20, at 259.
51. Note, supra note 20, at 259.
52. See supra note 35.

53. See, e.g., Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d at 338.
54. See, e.g., Polin v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1940); Burnquist v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 484 (1941), nonacq. 1944 C.B. 34, appeal dismissed per curiam, 123 F.2d 64
(8th Cir. 1941); Baird v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 970 (1940), nonacq. 1941-1 C.B. 12, acq.

1941-2 C.B. 2; Realty Operators, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.TA. 1051 (1939), nonacq. 1940-1
C.B. 8, petition for review dismissed, 118 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1941); Commonwealth, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 36 B.TA. 850 (1937), nonacq. 1958-1 C.B. 38, acq. 1941-2 CiB. 3.
INcoME
55. The cases are collected in 3B J. MERTNs, MERTENs LAw oF FEDER.
TAxATON § 22.92 n.99 (1973).
56. 153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd on other grounds, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).

57. Id. at 511.
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Revenue Ruling.58 While the ruling predictably concluded that a charitable
gift of property encumbered by recourse debt constituted a sale to the extent
of the liability transferred, -' 9 the Service unexpectedly relied on Crane as
support for this ruling. Observers noted the ruling's potentially wide application and suggested that its reasoning might impose capital treatment upon
losses realized through transfers in lieu of foreclosure.6°
6
Subsequent rulings confirmed commentators' suspicions. In a 1976 Ruling, '
the Commissioner determined that a taxpayer's reconveyance of cattle to his
seller in complete satisfaction of a nonrecourse purchase money mortgage
constituted a sale. 62 The Service relied solely on its computation of the taxpayer's "amount realized" under Crane in reaching this determination.63 The
ruling found a "sale" because the disposition produced an "amount realized."
In support of this proposition, the Service cited three cases which held that reconveyances by recourse obligors constituted "sales or exchanges. ' ' 64 Without
additional explanation, the Service concluded case law "well established" that
the transfer of assets in consideration for cancellation of indebtedness equated
to a sale.65 Because the ruling cited no case in which a sale arose solely upon
cancellation of nonrecourse debt, the Service's application of its well-established
principle to the facts of the ruling must be questioned. In light of the authority
cited, the ruling's holding appears to be a mere leap of faith inspired by
Crane's computation of amount realized.
The Service employed similar reasoning in a 1978 Revenue Ruling.6 6
Addressing a nonrecourse mortgagor's reconveyance of encumbered real
property to his mortgagee, the Commissioner predictably concluded that the
disposition qualified as a sale under section 1222.67 In justifying its decision,
the Service explained that legal distinctions between judicial foreclosures and
transfers in lieu of foreclosure did not warrant any substantive difference in
tax treatment. 68 Because the taxpayer included his nonrecourse liability in
computing "amount realized" under section 1001, however, the conveyance
"accordingly" qualified as a "sale or exchange."6' 9
The Commissioner's willingness to relitigate the abandonment-voluntary
reconveyance question in light of Crane and his renewed substance-over-form
argument became unmistakably apparent in two recent Tax Court decisions.
Both cases raised issues concerning the continued viability of the consideration
58. Rev. Rul. 70-626, 1970-2 C.B. 158.
59. Id.
60. Handier, supra note 1, at 240-41.
61. 1976-1 C.B. 214. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-1 C.B. 264.
62. 1976-1 C.B. at 215.
63. Id.
64. Id. See also Woodsam Assoc., Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 649 (1951), aft'd, 198 F.2d
357 (2d Cir. 1952); Unique Art Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1341 (1947); Peninsula
Properties Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 84 (1942).
65. 1976-1 C.B. at 215.
66. Rev. Rul. 78-164, 1978-1 C.B. 264.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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requirement, the impact of Crane on the Code's characterization provisions,
and the validity of the Commissioner's substance-over-form argument.
The Commissioner's Victory:
Freeland v. Commissioner
Freelandv. Commissioner"o is the first of a series of Tax Court decisions
departing from the traditional judicial definition of "sale or exchange." 71 In
1968, Eugene Freeland purchased nine acres of unimproved real property in
California for $50,000.72 Freeland financed his purchase by paying $9,000 and
tendering a nonrecourse note and mortgage for the $41,000 balance.73 After
unforeseen circumstances reduced the property's fair market value to $27,000,
the taxpayer voluntarily reconveyed the property to his seller, effecting an
abandonment under California law.74 In computing his federal income tax
liability for the reconveyance year, Eugene Freeland claimed a $9,000 ordinary
loss under sections 165(a) and (c)(2), asserting that his loss had arisen out of
abandonment. 75 The Commissioner disagreed with the taxpayer's characterization of his transfer and loss, however, and maintained instead that a capital
loss had resulted from the "sale or exchange" of a capital asset. 76
Relying on established case law, Freeland argued that his transfer escaped
classification as a "sale or exchange" because he had realized no economic
benefit from the transaction.77 He contended that a transferor's relief from nonrecourse liability alone failed to provide sufficient consideration to transform
a disposition into a "sale or exchange." 7 8 While conceding that an abandonment of property failed to qualify as a "sale or exchange,"7 9 the Commissioner
classified Freeland's transfer as the equivalent of a foreclosure sale. Under the
Service's substance-over-form argument, therefore, the transfer should produce
tax consequences identical to those accompanying judicial foreclosure.80 After
70. 74 T.C. 970 (1980).
71.

See supra note 8.

72. 74 T.C. at 971.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 972. According to the Freeland court, California recognized an abandonment
as occurring when there was an "intent to abandon and one decisive and conclusive act to
clearly indicate this intent." Id. at 974 (citing Gerhard v. Stephens, 442 P2d 692, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 612 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968)). While the Tax Court acknowledged that the taxpayer's
transfer constituted an abandonment under California law, the court correctly refused to
recognize state law classifications as determinative of federal income tax consequences. Id.
75. Id. at 974. The taxpayer's computation of his loss reflects that he observed Crane's
direct holding and included nonrecourse debt in his amount realized under section 1001(b).
Loss was computed as follows:
Amount realized:
$ 41,000 (nonrecourse debt)
Adjusted basis:
-50,000
Loss realized:
($9,000)
76. Id.

.

-

77. Id. at 979.
78. id. at 980.
79. Id. at 974. The Commissioner's concession that -an abandonment did not give rise
to a "sale or exchange" distinguishes Freeland from the Tax Court's subsequeni decision
in Middleton v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 310 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 143-47.
80. 74 T.C. at 974.
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analyzing the consideration requirement, the Crane doctrine, and the transaction's functional equivalence with judicial foreclosure, the Freeland court
agreed that the taxpayer's voluntary reconveyance constituted a "sale or exchange."81
Is

CONSIDERATION STILL NECESSARY

FOR A "SALE OR EXCHANGE"?

Although unofficial federal tax sources state unequivocally that consideration is an essential element of a "sale" or an "exchange,"82 some cases suggest
that a seller's receipt of consideration is no longer an indispensable component
of a sale.8 3 Cases not requiring consideration for a sale draw support from the
Supreme Court's decisions in Hamme8 4 and Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge
Supply & Lumber Co.85
The Supreme Court concluded in Hammel that involuntary sales, such as
those accompanying foreclosure of recourse mortgages, qualify as sales or exchanges under the Code's characterization provisions.86 Because neither the
statutory purpose, legislative history, nor plain meaning of the contested
language mandated exclusion of such involuntary sales, the Court found no
justification for judicially excluding such sales from the statute's application.8 7
The Court, however, did perceive congressional intent to interpret the term
"sale or exchange" broadly.88
The Supreme Court's decision in Nebraska Bridge extended Hammel to
foreclosure sales involving nonrecourse mortgages. In Nebraska Bridge, the
state of Arkansas bid on a corporate taxpayer's title to real property to satisfy
81. Id. at 981-82. See generally Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941); Helvering v.
Nebraska Bridge & Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 666 (1941), rev'g per curiam 115 F.2d 288 (8th Cir.
1940); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
82. 6 FED. TAxEs (P-H) ff32,257 (1982). But see J. MERTENS, supra note 55, § 2292 &
n.99, which states: "It is probable, furthermore, that there may be a 'sale or exchange' even
though there is an absence of consideration. See Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge .
Id.
I..."
83. Russo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 135, 152 (1977). See also Freeland v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 970, 980-81 (1980). Cf. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 312
U.S. 666 (1941) (cited by Russo court as standing for this proposition), rev'g per curiam
115 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1940). See also infra text accompanying notes 85-102.
84. Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S 504 (1941).
85. Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge & Lumber Co., 115 F.2d 288, rev'd per curiam, 312 U.S.
666 (1940). See also Commissioner v. Abramson, 124 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1942); Commissioner
v. Peterman, 118 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1941); Welch v. Street, 116 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1941);
Russo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 135 (1977).
86. Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 511 (1941).
87. Id. at 509.
88. Id. The Hammel court perceived a congressional intention that "sale or exchange"
be read expansively after analyzing statutory amendments extending "sale or exchange" treatment to specific otherwise nonqualifying losses. Id. at 508-11. An opposite interpretation of
this factor might be reached under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alteriusCongress' specific provision of "sale or exchange" treatment for designated items would preclude application of such treatment to items other than those specified. Subsequent courts
have followed Hamrmel's reasoning and have defined "sale or exchange" broadly. See supra
note 34.
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property taxes for *hich the taxpayer was not personally liable. 89 When the
corporation subsequently attempted to deduct the resulting loss as an ordinary
forfeiture loss, the Commissioner intervened and characterized the item as a
capital loss realized through a "sale or exchange." 90 Both the Board of Tax
Appeals and the Eighth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's contention, however, and determined that no sale had occurred because the transfer had been
involuntary and without consideration passing to the transferor. 91 Citing
precedent, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "sale or exchange" includes only
voluntary transfers of property made for valuable consideration. 92
Upon the Commissioner's appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit's Nebraska Bridge holding in a fifteen-word per curiam opinion which
cited only Hammel.93 The Court's reversal, read in light of Hammel and the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Nebraska Bridge, suggested to some courts that
consideration no longer served as an element of a foreclosure sale.9 4 Deriving
such an interpretation from Nebraska Bridge, however, ignores the narrow
factual context in which the case arose. Like Hammel, Nebraska Bridge involved a foreclosure sale, in which consideration existed in the form of the
bid.9r Because the Supreme Court did not address consideration in either decision, one might reasonably conclude that the Court found or assumed the

requirement to be satisfied. Conceivably, therefore, the Court's reversal in
Nebraska Bridge sought only to correct the Eighth Circuit's erroneous exclusion
of actual, involuntary sales from statutory "sale or exchange" status, and was
not intended to revolutionize the consideration requirement.9 Indeed, one
court subsequently found Nebraska Bridge confined to expunging the "voluntary transfer" requirement, and therefore refused to recognize the case as
modifying the need for consideration. 97
Notwithstanding the questionable judicial underpinnings of the premise
that consideration is irrelevant in a foreclosure sale, the Tax Court endorsed
this proposition at various times in recent years. Each endorsement placed great
significance upon the Supreme Court's brief Nebraska Bridge decision, and one
subscribing case 98 even took license with the Eighth Circuit's holding in
89. Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 115 F.2d 288, 289 (8th Cir. 1940),
rev'd per curiam, 812 U.S. 666 (1941).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 291.
92. Id. at 290.
93. Helvering v. Hammel, 812 U.S. 666, 667 (1941).
94. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 835, 388 (3d Cir. 1941); supra note 43 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 20, at 249-50, where the author states:
Thus, it is now well settled that a foreclosure sale produces a capital gain or loss because a foreclosure sale comes within the plain meaning of the "sale or exchange" requirement. Where the disposition of the mortgaged property is not a "sale" as that
term is generally understood, however, the Hammel rationale provides no guidance
in determining whether the disposition is a "sale or exchange."
98. Russo v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 185 (1977).
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Nebraska Bridge to make that reversal appear more compelling.9 9 The Freeland
court's analysis of Hammel and Nebraska Bridge, however, elevated the assault
upon the consideration requirement to new heights.
In Freeland,the court noted that Hammel and Nebraska Bridge "appeared"
to support the conclusion that consideration is not necessary in the context of a
foreclosure sale. Because Hammel also endorsed interpreting the term "sale or
exchange" broadly, the Freeland court found no reason to exclude a voluntary
reconveyance, the substantive equivalent of foreclosure, from "sale or exchange"
status. Citing case law dismissing consideration as irrelevant in foreclosure sales,
the Freeland court suggested that consideration also could be ignored in
connection with deeds in lieu of foreclosure. 1°° Having made an unprecedented
extension of Hammel and Nebraska Bridge from their actual sale contexts into
the realm of sale equivalents, the Freelandcourt then made an implicit retreat
from wholesale elimination of the consideration requirement. In deference to
older cases which placed tremendous emphasis on the transferor's receipt of a
benefit from the transfer, 1°1 the court continued to examine the consideration
question and found consideration supplied under the Crane rationale 0 2
Eleven months after its Freeland decision, the Tax Court created further
uncertainty about the continued viability of the consideration requirement. 0 3
In a case quoting traditional definitions of "sale" and "exchange," which clearly
anticipate consideration passing to the transferor, the Tax Court cited its
earlier dismissal of the consideration requirement with some reservation.9 4 The
court, however, approved Freeland's utilization of Crane to supply consideration. 1°5 While recent case law creates some confusion about the continued
necessity of consideration in a "sale or exchange," Freelandand succeeding cases
99. In Russo, a case involving judicial foreclosure of a nonrecourse liability, the court
correctly cited Hammel and Nebraska Bridge as dispositive of the foreclosure issue raised,
but incorrectly discussed the holdings of the cases. Specifically, the Russo court erroneously
stated that the Eighth Circuit declined to characterize the Nebraska Bridge forfeiture as a
"sale or exchange" solely because the court found no consideration passing to the owner.
In fact, the Eighth Circuit predicated its holding in Nebraska Bridge equally upon the
court's determination that the transfer was involuntary. 68 T.C. at 151. The Russo court's conclusion that "[t]he Supreme Court's reversal .. . [in Nebraska Bridge] clearly indicates that
consideration flowing to the seller is not necessary for a 'sale'" becomes much less convincing
in light of the Eighth Circuit's actual holding. Id. at 151-52 (emphasis added).
100. Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970, 981 (1980).
101. Id. at 980-81.
102. The court stated: "We believe the holdings of Crane mandate the conclusion that
relief from indebtedness, even though there is no personal liability, is sufficient to support
a sale or exchange." Id. (emphasis in original).
103. See Guest v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 9 (1981).
104. Id. at 21. The Tax Court explained:
The phrase "sale or exchange" was intended by Congress to be given a broad reading,
and the words themselves are lo be given their ordinary meaning. Generally, a sale is a
transfer of property for money or a promise to pay money. An exchange on the other
hand is generally a reciprocal transfer of property. There is also some support for the
proposition that to have a sale the seller need not receive consideration.
Id. at 24.
105. Id.
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evidence the Tax Court's willingness to employ the Crane doctrine to'generate
any consideration that might be required.
UTILIZING Crane TO SUPPORT A
"SALE OR EXCHANGE"

In Crane, the Supreme Court addressed the amount of gain realized by a
taxpayer on the sale of an apartment building encumbered by nonrecourse
debt.100 After operating the building for seven years, and claiming depredation
deductions computed on an adjusted basis increhsed by the nonrecourse
mortgage, the taxpayer in Crane sold the property to a third party to avoid the
mortgagee's threatened foreclosure.' 07 When the sale occurred, the balance of
the mortgage equalled the fair market value of the property, and the transaction generated net proceeds of $2,500 for the taxpayer. 08 Asserted tax deficiencies ensued when the taxpayer subsequently computed and reported gain
solely on the basis of the $2,500 received. 0 9 Agreeing with the Commissioner's
assertions, the Supreme Court determined that the taxpayer's gain should have
been computed by including the balance of the nonrecourse liability transferred
in "amount realized.""10 The taxpayer's lack of personal liability on the encumbrance did not alter the Court's conclusion."' The Court recognized a nonrecourse mortgagor transferring property subject to the mortgage realized an
economic benefit equivalent to the discharge of the encumbrance."12 The Court
did note one possible exception to the economic benefit theory, however, when
it stated in footnote thirty-seven, "[o]bviously, if the value of the property is
less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable
cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different
problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property
or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot.""13
4
Commentators found the Crane decision reflected two lines of reasoning:"1
106. 331 US. at 14.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 13-14.
111. Id. at 14. The court stated:
[W]e think that a mortgagor, not personally liable on the debt, who sells the property
subject to the mortgage and for additional consideration, realizes a benefit in the
amount of the mortgage as well as the boot. If a purchaser pays boot, it is immaterial
as to our problem whether the mortgagor is also to receive money from the purchaser
to discharge the mortgage prior to sale, or whether he is merely to transfer subject to
the mortgage - it may make a difference to the purchaser and to the mortgagee, but not
to the mortgagor. Or put in another way, we are no more concerned with whether the
mortgagor is, strictly speaking, a debtor on the mortgage, than we are with whether
the benefit to him is, strictly speaking, a receipt of money or property.
Id. (footnote omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 Tsx L. Ray.
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a tax benefit, or balancing entry approach and an economic benefit analysis."1
The first rationale won their approval as a necessary adjustment at the time of
the taxpayer's disposition. The balancing entry served as a corollary to the taxpayer's inclusion of nonrecourse debt in adjusted basis for purposes of computing depreciation deductions. 116 Because the taxpayer had benefitted from
depreciation deductions computed on a basis inflated beyond actual equity, or
investment, in the property, fairness dictated that the tax benefit resulting
from such excess depreciation be offset by forcing the taxpayer to include the
nonrecourse debt in "amount realized" when computing gain. 117 Viewed in this
light, Crane's holding appeared accurate and fair.
Crane's second line of reasoning, the economic benefit analysis, impressed
commentators as more troublesome, non-essential,"" and unpersuasive. 119
According to the Court, as long as the property's fair market value exceeded
the amount of nonrecourse liability encumbering it, the taxpayer would feel
economically compelled to pay mortgage installments as they became due to
prevent loss of his equity through the mortgagee's foreclosure.120 The Court
theorized that by transferring property subject to a mortgage, the taxpayer
realized relief from a burden imposed by economic reality. Such relief constituted a benefit to the taxpayer as real and as substantial as if the mortgage were
discharged, or as if a personal debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another.'2 Economic reality, therefore, justified according identical treatment
to transfers of property subject to recourse and nonrecourse debt.
While commentators acknowledged that uniform treatment for recourse
and nonrecourse obligations furthered judicial goals of certainty and administrative simplicity, 22 they questioned the validity of Crane's economic benefit
analysis and submitted that it overstated the resemblance between nonrecourse
and personal obligations. 23 Although a nonrecourse mortgagor would protect
his property investment by paying mortgage obligations, he would not
necessarily realize the same economic benefit upon a transfer of his interest as
would a recourse obligor. 2 4 Indeed, the basis for saying that a nonrecourse
obligor received any benefit at all was questionable 2 5
277 (1978); Del Cotto, Basis and Amount
Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U.
115. Bittker, supra note 114, at 281.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Del Cotto, supra note 114, at 84.
119. Bittker, supra note 114, at 282.
120. 311 U.S. at 14. See also Del Cotto,
121. 311 U.S. at 14.
122. Bittker, supra note 114, at 282.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 281.
125. Id. at 282. As noted by Professor

Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some
PA. L. REy. 69, 83-84 (1969).

supra note 114, at 84.

Boris Bittker:

Relief from a nonrecourse debt is not an economic benefit if it can be obtained only
by giving up the mortgaged property. It is analogous t.o the relief one obtains from
local real property taxes by disposing of the property: Like nonrecourse debt, the taxes
must be paid to retain the property; but no one would suggest that the disposition of
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As the CraneCourt itself appears to have suggested in footnote thirty-seven,
the economic benefit doctrine loses credibility when the mortgage balance exceeds the property's fair market value.126 The economic compulsion, which the
Court believed equated a nonrecourse obligor's desire to satisfy his mortgage
debt with a recourse mortgagor's legal obligation to pay the liability, vanishes
when encumbered property becomes worthless.127 What benefit then inures to a
nonrecourse obligor when he transfers subject to an encumbrance which is no
1 28
longer economically tantamount to a personal liability?
unprofitable property produces an economic benefit equal to the present value of the
taxes that will not be paid in the future.
Id.

126. While considerable uncertainty surrounds the import of footnote 87, many commentators support the view that it was intended by the Crane Court to qualify its economic
benefit line of reasoning. See Del Cotto, supra note 114, at 85.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 84. The Fifth Circuit attempted to value the benefit inuring to a taxpayer
upon his release from nonrecourse liability in Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.
1981), rev'g 70 T.C. 756 (1978), cert. granted, May 8, 1982, where the court was called upon
to determine the proper amount realized by a taxpayer upon his sale of property encumbered
by nonrecourse debt in excess of fair market value. After analyzing the Crane decision and
concluding that the economic benefit theory served as the basis for the Crane holding, the
Tufts court stated:
The economic benefit theory is, we think, seriously flawed, in that it is premised on the
notion that "an owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the
property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they
were his personal obligations." We admit that we initially succumbed to the facial
appeal of that notion, but on reflection we are convinced that it rings true only so long
as the taxpayer actually wants to keep the property ....

If the taxpayer decides, for

any reason whatsoever, that he no longer wants the burdens and responsibilities that
accompany ownership, he can transfer the property to a third party with absolutely no
regard to that party's willingness or ability to meet the mortgage obligations, yet rest
assured that his other assets cannot be reached .... We do not deny that Mrs. Crane
received some benefit: a purchaser had to pay off the mortgage or at least be willing
to take the property subject to the mortgage before Mrs. Crane could pocket her $2500
in equity. We do, however, seriously question whether the full amount of nonrecourse debt is an accurate measure of that benefit.
Because, as indicated above, we have serious reservations about the Crane decision, we decline to extend it beyond the facts of that case, and we therefore conclude
that the fair market limitation so "[o]bviously" anticipated by footnote 87 is warranted.
Id. at 1062-68.
Judge Williams' concurring opinion in Tufts relied upon the "freeing-of-assets theory
underlying the cancellation of indebtedness cases" to classify Mrs. Crane's release from nonrecourse indebtedness as property with a "fair market value .. . correspond[ing] directly to
the fair market value of the property securing the nonrecourse indebtedness." Id. at 1065. The
majority opinion disagreed with this characterization and valuation insofar as it was applicable
to nonrecourse indebtedness in Crane:
Further, we do not agree with Judge Williams' conclusion that the fair market value
of the release "corresponds directly" with the fair market value of the property securing
the nonrecourse indebtedness. As we noted in the text, Mrs. Crane benefited in, that a
release was a prerequisite to recovery of her $2500 equity.
Id. at 1064 n.9.
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While Freeland suggests that the taxpayer, whose nonrecourse mortgage
exceeded the encumbered parcel's value, may have questioned the propriety
of applying the Crane doctrine to transform his disposition into a "sale or exchange," the decision does not resolve the question. The Freeland court responded to the taxpayer's protest by stating that Crane's footnote thirty-seven
did not address whether there had been a sale, but rather explored only the
amount realized on a sale. 129 Although the Freeland court's evaluation of the
significance of footnote thirty-seven is admittedly correct, the court's response
appears inconsistent with its own application of Crane to the consideration
question. Logically, if the court intended to rely on Crane to supply the consideration that older and more persuasive decisions found necessary to support
"sale or exchange," the court could not dismiss footnote thirty-seven as pertaining only to quantifying amount realized. The entire Crane decision represents
an attempt to quantify amount realized.130 A more helpful response would have
addressed whether the amount realized under Crane's direct holding is
necessarily synonymous with consideration, when economic reality suggests
that the transferor received no direct benefit for his transfer.
Authorities disagree as to whether a nonrecourse transferor's amount
realized under Crane is consideration for a "sale or exchange." One view finds
it anomalous that nonrecourse debt could become a part of amount realized
under section 1001(b), and yet not constitute consideration for purposes of
section 1222's "sale or exchange" requirement. 1 1 Under this view, the distinction, if any, between a benefit mandating inclusion in amount realized and
consideration is without substance. 3 2 Another view suggests that Crane's goal

While the Tufts opinion is instructive in showing the analysis that might be undertaken
in valuing a nonrecourse obligor's release from indebtedness, the opinion provides no solution
as to what the value of such a release might be when the transferor in fact receives no
benefit in the form of recovery of equity. Because commentators have read the Tufts opinion
as implying that "the benefit Mrs. Crane received was indeed her $2500 in equity," it would
be reasonable to assume that a transferor receiving no equity would receive no actual economic
benefit, even though Crane's direct holding would mandate an inclusion in amount realized.
Sulwalsky, Disposition of Devalued Investments- Tufts v. Commissioner and Footnote 37,
82-2 TAX MGMr. MEM. (BNA) 3, 8 (Jan 25, 1982).
129. The Freeland court stated:
Since Crane v. Commissioner . . . was not concerned with whether there had been a
sale but only with the "amount realized" on a sale, the problem referred to in n. 37
would relate only to the "amount realized" under the circumstances recited and would
not be relevant to whether there was a sale or exchange.
74 T.C. at 978.
130. As the Freeland court itself recognized: "Here, of course, we are concerned with
whether there was a sale. Although indirectly related to that issue, Crane and the cases that
followed it were primarily related to how much gain or loss was realized." Id.
131. See Lenway v .Commissioner, 69 T.C. 620, 628 n.9 (1978) (Fay, J., dissenting), afl'd,
620 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1980).
132. Id. See also Evangelista v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1057 (1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 1281 (7th
Cir. 1980). In Evangelista, the Tax Court represented the Crane doctrine as holding that "an
encumbrance on property satisfied by the transfer of that property is a part of the consideration received for the property." 71 T.C. at 1062 (emphasis added). The court gave no
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of providing uniform tax treatment to recourse and nonrecourse mortgagors
necessitates viewing "amount realized" as synonymous with consideration.
Under this view it appears inconsistent to include nonrecourse debt in, the
computing of amount realized, while confining "sale or exchange" status to
transfers of recourse debt or transactions involving boot. 133
While these views find support in both logic and tax policy objectives,
principles of statutory construction may provide a more compelling position.
If "amount realized," which arises upon the "sale or other disposition" of
property under section 1001(b), is allowed to fulfill the consideration requirement for a "sale or exchange" under the Code's characterization provisions, all
"dispositions" automatically will be elevated to "sale or exchange" status when
nonrecourse debt is present. Contrary to Flaccus,"34 which dearly established
that a section 1001(b) disposition does not constitute a section 1222 "sale or exchange," all dispositions of property encumbered by nonrecourse debt will be
regarded as "sales or exchanges" and will produce capital gain or loss consequences. If such a result is desirable, should not Congress, rather than the judiciary, effect its enactment? 35 Furthermore, because equating amount realized
with consideration apparently stems from Crane'sdishonored economic benefit
analysis, and because Crane itself appeared to be a "balancing entry" anomaly
that arose in the area of gain and loss realization, Crane should be considered
carefully before its holding is extended cavalierly beyond its factual context and
applied to the characterization provisions of the Code.
VOLUNTARY kECONvEYANCE As THE SUBSTANTIVE
EQUIVALENT OF A FORECLOSURE SALE

The Freeland court's resolution of the consideration question in light of
Crane was a necessary prerequisite to the court's adoption of the Service's substance-over-form reasoning. Only after disposing of the annoying consideration
requirement could the court effectuate uniform capital loss treatment for foreclosure and reconveyance losses. 36 Perceiving a congressional desire to achieve
uniformity and to prevent taxpayer manipulation of the characterization provisions, the Freelandcourt found that Congress did not intend to give taxpayers
the advantage of realizing beneficial ordinary losses, by voluntarily reconveying
encumbered property, while minimizing possible gains by forcing the mortgagee
to foreclose. 37 Conversely, both transactions should produce comparable tax
results because both equally relieved the obligor of liened property and the
further explanation for its substitution of consideration for amount realized in the traditional
explanation of the Crane doctrine.
133. Handler, supra note 1, at 240.
134. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
135. This modification should not be effected by the judiciary because such change
violates the principle that courts are not privileged to rewrite legislative language, despite
any judicial belief that such a substitution would more effectively promote the perceived
congressional policy than the language chosen by the lawmaking body. Stokes v., Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 1941).
136. See supra notes 35, 45-48 and accompanying text.

137. 74 T.C. at 980.
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obligation to pay property taxes.138 No forgiveness of indebtedness resulted in

either case.' 39
While the Freeland court's conclusion that voluntary transfers qualify as
"sales or exchanges" is understandable, and perhaps desirable from the perspective of tax policy and administrative simplicity, its holding must be questioned
in light of its impact on the statutory language of the characterization provisions. As one commentator submitted, recognizing foreclosure equivalents as
sales or exchanges necessarily extends the reach of the "sale or exchange" requirement beyond its proper scope and makes every transfer equal within
the terms of the statuteJ 40 It is surprising that the judiciary effected this modification in light of its earlier reluctance to invade Congress' legislative prerogative. 141
Middleton v. Commissioner: The
Freeland Holding Extended
While the Tax Court in Freeland refrained from extending "sale or exchange" status to abandonments of property, 4 2 the court made this extension
with ease in Middleton v. Commissioner.-4 Confronted with a nonrecourse
obligor whose partnership had abandoned real property after its mortgagees
refused to accept reconveyance, the Middleton court quickly applied its Freeland analysis to the facts before it.44 Functionally, the court perceived no logical
distinction between relief from indebtedness through voluntary reconveyance
and the rejected proffer of reconveyance. 14 5 Relief from indebtedness under
Freeland's holding provided the consideration necessary to support a "sale or
exchange," regardless of whether such relief arose from the taxpayer's voluntary
reconveyance in lieu of foreclosure, as in Freeland, or from the taxpayer's
property abandonment. 4 6 The Middleton court noted that the consequences
flowing from voluntary reconveyance of property subject to nonrecourse debt,
likewise flow from abandonment of such encumbered property. 4 7 Once one
accepts the Freelandrationale that the consideration necessary to transform a
disposition into a sale is supplied under the Crane doctrine, the Middleton
138.

Id. at 981.

139. Id.
140. Note, supra note 20, at 258. As Stokes observed, every transfer brought equally
within the terms of the statute means "sale" or any other transaction by which the owner
divests himself of property. Id.

141. For a discussion of judicial revision of clear statutory language, see Abdalla v. Commissioner, 647 F.2d 487, 496-99 (5th Cir. 1981).
142. The Commissioner's concession in Freeland that an abandonment of property encumbered by nonrecourse debt did not constitute a "sale or exchange," eliminated the
necessity of the Freeland court's addressing this issue. See 74 T.C. at 974.
143. 77 T.C. 310 (1981).
144. Id. at 321.
145. Id.
146.

Id. at 320-21.

147. Id. The court recognized that "the mortgagor in each case is relieved of encumbered
property and also is relieved of the obligations to pay taxes and assessments against the
property." Id.
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court's holding that an abandonment constitutes a sale becomes an expected
conclusion.
CONCLUSION

While the result reached by the Tax Court in Freelandand Middleton might
be applauded for eliminating often artificial distinctions in the treatment of
recourse and nonrecourse liabilities,- 8 the ramifications of these decisions upon
the Code's definition of "sale or exchange" must be acknowledged and perhaps
questioned. Specifically, in attempting to impose a uniform "sale or exchange"
characterization upon transactions with genuinely dissimilar legal consequences,
the Tax Court has been forced to redefine the term "sale or exchange" in a
manner which makes it synonymous with a mere disposition of encumbered
property. It is unfortunate that this definitional shift has been effected seemingly unwittingly, and under the guise of finding consideration supplied under
the Crane doctrine. While Crane might be read broadly as endorsing the
elimination of tax distinctions arising with regard to recourse and nonrecourse
debt, the decision cannot logically be extended to supply consideration when
economic reality suggests no benefit is present. One cannot help but question
whether any beneficial, functional result achieved by Freeland and Middleton
might not have been more appropriately effectuated by Congress after careful
consideration of the statutory ramifications attending uniform "sale or exchange" treatment.
ELIZABETH S. WHEELER
148. Handler, supra note 1, at 243.
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